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ABSTRACT 
What is the neural representation of a speech code as it evolves in time? How do listeners 
integrate temporally distributed phonemic information across hundreds of milliseconds, even 
backwards in time, into coherent representations of syllables and words? What sorts of brain 
mechanisms encode the correct temporal order, despite such backwards effects, during speech 
perception? How does the brain extract rate-invariant properties of variable-rate speech? This 
mticle describes an emerging neural model that suggests answers to these questions, while 
quantitatively simulating challenging data about audition, speech and word recognition. This 
model includes bottom-up filtering, horizontal competitive, and top-down attentional interactions 
between a working memory for short-term storage of phonetic items and a list categorization 
network for grouping sequences of items. The conscious speech and word recognition code is 
suggested to be a resonant wave of activation across such a network, and a percept of silence is 
proposed to be a temporal discontinuity in the rate with which such a resonant wave evolves. 
Properties of these resonant waves can be traced to the brain mechanisms whereby auditory, 
speech, and language representations are learned in a stable way through time. Because 
resonances are proposed to control stable learning, the model is called an Adaptive Resonance 
Theory, or ART, model. 
Key words: speech perception, word recogmtwn, auditory scene analysis, consciousness, 
adaptive resonance, context effects, consonant perception, vowel perception, neural network, 
silent duration, working memory, categorization, habituation, automatic gain control 
Introduction: Learning, Expectation, Attention, and Resonance 
How are brain events converted into behaviors and percepts? An answer to this question is 
needed if we are to understand how the brain controls behavior and how the brain is, in turn, 
shaped by environmental feedback that is experienced on the behavioral leveL The nature of this 
connection also needs to be understood if we are to develop biologically plausible models of how 
the brain works. 
The present article illustrates the hypothesis that conscious auditory and speech percepts 
are emergent properties that arise from resonant states of the brain. Such a resonance develops 
when bottom-up signals that are activated by environmental events interact with top-down 
expectations, or prototypes, that have been learned from prior experiences (Figure 1 a). The top-
clown expectations control a matching process that selects those combinations of bottom-up 
features which are consistent with the learned prototype, while inhibiting those that are not 
(Figure !b). In this way, an attentional focus starts to develop that concentrates activation on 
those feature clusters that are deemed important, based on past experience. The attended feature 
clusters, in turn, reactivate the cycle of bottom-up and top-down signal exchange. This reciprocal 
exchange of signals causes the selected cells to resonate with amplified and synchronized 
activities. Such a resonance binds the attended features together into a coherent brain state. 
Resonant states, rather than the activations that are due to bottom-up processing alone, are 
proposed to be the brain events that represent conscious behavior. The amplified and 
synchronous activations that occur during brain resonances are also proposed to enable the brain 
to learn quickly about important new information without catastrophically forgetting already 
learned information. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, is a cognitive and neural theory that 
is being developed to explain how the brain processes such resonant events (Grossberg, 1980, 
1999b). 
Figure 1 
Phonemic Restoration and Conscious Speech Perception 
A classical example of such a matching process occurs during phonemic restoration (Samuel, 
1981; Warren, 1984; Warren and Sherman, 1974). Suppose that a broad-band noise is followed 
immediately by the rapidly presented words "eel is on the ... " If that string of words is followed 
by the word "orange", then nnder proper temporal conditions, subjects hear "peel is on the 
orange". If the word "wagon" completes the sentence, "wheel is on the wagon" is heard. If the 
final word is "shoe", then "heel is on the shoe" is heard. Such experiences show that a bottom-up 
stimulus alone, such as "noise-eel", may not determine a conscious perception. Rather, the 
percept may be determined by the sound that one expects to hear in that auditory context on the 
basis of previous language experiences. 
To explain such percepts, we need to understand why "noise-eel" is not heard before the 
last word of the sentence is even presented. This may be explained by the fact that, if the 
resonance has not developed fully before the last word is presented, then this last word, when 
grouped together with earlier words of the sentence, can influence the selection of the top-clown 
expectations that determine the conscious percept. We also need to explain how the expectation 
can convert "noise-eel" into a percept of "heel". This is attributed to the top-down matching 
process that selects expected feature clusters for attentive processing while suppressing 
unexpected ones. In the "noise-eel" example, those spectral components of the noise are 
suppressed that are not patt of the expected consonant sound. This selection process directly 
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influences conscious phonetic percepts. It is not merely a process of symbolic inference. For 
example, if silence replaces noise, then only silence is heard. Moreover, if the sentence "eel is on 
the shoe" is heard, then that sentence conveys an entirely different meaning than the sentence 
"heel is on the shoe." Such data indicate that representations of phonetics and meaning must be 
able to intimately interact. Finally, if a reduced set of spectral components is used in the noise, 
then a correspondingly degraded consonant sound is heard (Samuel, 1981). 
Figure 2 
Neural Substrates of Attention, Matching, and Learning 
ART has predicted that a matching law with just these properties is needed for the brain to be 
able to stably learn new perceptual and cognitive representations, including auditory 
representations, without experiencing catastrophic forgetting (Grossberg, 1980, 1999b). The type 
of matching which is evident in speech percepts like phonemic restoration is thus proposed to 
illustrate brain mechanisms for rapidly learning speech and language representations. ART 
predicts that such matching is realized by a top-down modulatory on-center off-surround circuit 
(Figure 2a). The on-center is modulatory because its excitatory and inhibitory signals are 
approximately balanced. Such a top-down signal may increase the baseline activity of cells in the 
on-center, but cannot fire them. The off-surround can strongly inhibit non-matched cues. Related 
modeling work has identified laminar cortical circuits that realize such a top-down circuit and are 
capable of carrying out the ART marching rule (Grossberg, 1999a; Raizada and Grossberg, 
2001); see Figure 2b. 
Recent neurophysiological experiments have begun to directly confirm the ART-
predicted links between learning, top-clown matching, attention and synchronous resonant 
dynamics. In pmticular, the claim that bottom-up sensory activity is enhanced when matched by 
top-down signals is in accord with an extensive neurophysiological literature showing the 
facilitatory effect of attcntional feedback (e.g, Luck et al., 1997; Roelfsema et al., 1998). The on-
center off-surround stmcture of top-clown feedback has been demonstrated in the visual system 
both for V2-to-.Vl feedback (Bullier et al., 1996) and for Vl-to-LGN feedback (Sillito et al., 
1994). Zhang ct al. (1997) have shown that feedback ti·om auditory cortex to the medial 
geniculate nucleus and the infereior colliculus also has an on-center off-surround form. 
Temereanca and Simons (200 1) have described evidence for such feedback in the rodent barrel 
system. Various other psychophysical and neurophysiological data have also shown that 
attention has a facilitatory on-center and suppressive off-surround (Caputo and Guerra, 1998; 
Downing, 1988; Mounts, 2000; Smith, Singh, and Greenlee, 2000; Steinman, Steinman, and 
Lchmkuhle, 1995; Vanduffel, Tootell, and Orban, 2000). 
Ahissar and Hochstein (1993) have provided psychophysical evidence for the predicted 
role of attention in controlling adult plasticity and perceptual learning. Gao and Suga (1998) 
have reported neurophysiological evidence that acoustic stimuli caused plastic changes in the 
inferior colliculus of bats only when it received top-down feedback from auditory cortex. This 
plasticity was also found to be enhanced when the auditory stimuli were made behaviorally 
relevant. Kmpa, Ghazanfar, and Nicolelis (1999) and Parker and Dostrovsky (1999) have found 
that cortical feedback also controls thalamic plasticity in the somatosensory system. 
Various data have also linked the themes of top-clown cortical feedback and learning to 
the prediction that resonant states tend to synchronize the activities of the resonating cells. Engel, 
Fries, and Singer (2001) and Pollen (1999) have provided excellent reviews of these ART-
supportive literatures. In summary, recent neurophysiological and psychophysical data have 
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provided significant additional experimental support for basic ART predictions that were first 
made in the 1970s. 
How Can the Future Influence the Past while Perception Proceeds from Past to Future? 
Given that a resonant event may lag behind the environmental stimuli that cause it, we need to 
develop a refined concept of how perceived psychological time is related to the times at which 
stimuli are presented. In particular, how can "future" events influence the perception of "past" 
events, yet lime be perceived to always flow from past to future? ART suggests that this is 
accomplished by a resonant wave that develops from past to future while it incorporates future 
constraints into its top-down decision process until each event in the resonance equilibrates. In 
other words, future events can influence past events if the future events occur in the time interval 
after the past events are first registered by the brain, yet before the past events resonate and 
become conscious. 
In order to represent such a time-dependent resonant process, we need to distinguish the 
external input rate from the internal processing rate at which the resonance evolves. Because 
external events may, in principle, occur at arbitrary times, the brain's rate process must have a 
finer time scale than any detectable external rate. It must also be faster than the resonance time 
scale that emerges as a result of bottom-up and top-down interactions. That is why differential 
equations are used to describe ART models. Differential equations are the universally accepted 
mathematical formalism in science that is used to describe events that are evolving in real time. 
A related question concems how future events can influence past events without smearing over 
all the events that intervene. In particular, how can silent intervals be perceived between the 
words "heel" and "shoe" in "heel is on the shoe" given that the influence of "shoe" must cross all 
of the preceding sounds to influence "heel"? Here again the nature of the top-down matching 
process is paramount. This matching process can select feature components that are consistent 
with its prototype, but it cannot "create something out of nothing". Silence remains silence, no 
matter bow active the top-down prototypes may be. 
Figure 3 
Silence is a Discontinnity in the Rate at which Resonance Evolves 
The opposite concem must also be considered: How can sharp word boundaries be perceived 
even if the sound spectrum that represents sequential words exhibits no silent intervals between 
them? ART proposes that silence will be heard between words whenever there is a temporal 
break between the resonances that represent the individual words. In other words, silence is a 
discontinuity in the rate at which resonance evolves. This hypothesis helps to account for the fact 
that the relationship between there being no energy in the acoustic waveform at a given time and 
perceived silence at that time is not a simple one. Figure 3 illustrates, for example, that a listener 
can hear silence between syllables [ib) followed by [ga] at the same silent interval between these 
syllables as when they would hear continuous sound when presented with [ib] followed by [ba] 
(Repp, 1980). Moreover, such a silent interval can be over 100 msec long' ART explains such 
data as an example of resonant reset of fbi by /g/ in the case of [ib]-(ga], and resonant .fusion of 
the first /b/ with the second /b/ in the case of [ib]-[ba]; see Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
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Given that a resonance can be reset by a mismatching later event, it remains to explain how 
resonances end when there aTe no later mismatching events, as when one can hear two distinct 
/b/ sounds in [ib]-[ba] if the silent interval is loug enough. The ART model proposes that there 
are activity-dependent habituative transmitters within the resonating pathways of the model, and 
that persistent release of these transmitters during resonance weakens the feedback signals that 
support the resonance and thereby end it. Thus, a resonance can be terminated by either of two 
mechanisms: resonant reset or habituative collapse. 
Figure 3 also illustrates an important property of variable-rate speech perception. Note 
that there are three categmy boundary curves for each of the VC-CV syllables [ib ]-[ga] and [ib ]-
[ba]. This is because the mean silent interval was varied in each of the three cases for a fixed pair 
of VC-CV syllables. The three curves show that listeners track the mean silent interval in making 
their judgements. These rate-dependent category boundary shifts have been explained by 
assuming that the brain is trying to create rate-independent speech and language representations. 
In particular, humans can understand variable-rate speech without having to represent it 
intemally at every rate, which would create an uncontrollable combinatorial explosion and 
undeciferable decoding problem. The model assumes that there exists a rate-dependent gain 
control process which can speed up or slow down the integration rate of the resonance in 
response to the speech rate. Figure 5 summarizes the ARTPHONE model of Grossberg, 
Boardman, and Cohen (1997) which quantitatively simulated the Repp (1980) data, and showed 
how to explain many other data of this type, by using a combination of resonant feedback, rate-
dependent gain control, and habituative transmitter gating. 
Figure 5 
The example in Figure 3 may at first seem to be in conflict with the lesson learned from 
phonemic restoration that a bottom-up signal, such as the noise in "noise-eel," is needed to hear a 
word like "heel" in response to the action of a top-down expectation: The top-clown expectation, 
by itself, cannot "create something out of nothing". How, then, can the sound /b/ fill such a long 
silent interval during which it is not actively being generated by spectral energy from the outside 
world? ART proposes that this can happen because sounds are stored in a working memory 
which enables them to be acted upon by later-acting top-down expectations, much as the noise is 
stored in "noise-eel" until the last word of the rapidly presented sentence "noise-eel is on the 
shoe" can occur and lead to the percept of "heel." 
Resonance between STORE Working Memory Items and List Chunk Categories 
In order to make these concepts precise and workable, an analysis of psychological space, no less 
than of psychological time, is required. In particular, it is not sufficient to posit processing levels 
that proceed, say, from letters to words, as in the populai Interactive Activation Model 
(McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1982). The language units that 
are familiar to us from daily experience, such as phonemes, letters, and words, do not form 
appropriate levels in a language processing hierarchy, because such a representation cannot lemn 
stable representations of words in an unsupervised fashion, and is not consistent with various 
data about word recognition, as was pointed out in Grossberg (1984, 1986). Rather, processing 
levels that compute more abstract properties of auditmy processing are needed, in particular, a 
working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Cohen and Grossberg, 1986; Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b; 
Miller, 1956) is posited that represents sequences of items that have been unitized through prior 
teaming experiences. Such items are familiar feature clusters that are presented within a brief 
time interval. They become items by being categorized, or unitized, at a processing stage that 
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occurs before the working memory stage. As items are processed through time, they generate an 
evolving spatial pattern of activations that are stored temporarily across the working memory. 
The working memory hereby recodes a temporally occurring sequence of events into an evolving 
spatial pattern of activation. This spatial pattern represents both item information (which items 
are stored) and temporal order information (the order in which they are stored). 
A number of articles have modeled the design principles governing such item-and-order 
working memories and have used them to explain data about free recall (Grossberg, 1978a, 
1978b), reaction time during sequential motor performance (Boardman and Bullock, 1991; 
Grossberg and Kuperstein, 1986/1989), enors in serial item and order recall that are due to rapid 
attention shifts (Grossberg and Stone, 1986a), errors and reaction times during lexical priming 
and episodic memory experiments (Grossberg and Stone, 1986b ), and data concerning word 
superiority, phonemic restoration, and backward effects on speech perception (Grossberg, 1986). 
Such a wide range of data fall under the purview of these working memory models because they 
all satisfy two simple postulates (Bradski, Carpenter, and Grossberg, 1992, 1994; Grossberg, 
1978a, 1978b ). These postulates predict how unitized representations, or chunks, of lists of items 
that are stored in the working memory can be learned in a stable way; see Figure 1. The key 
postulate, which I have called the LTM lnvariance Principle (Grossberg, 1978a, 1978b), 
proposes how working memories, which encode a type of short-term memory, are designed in a 
way to enable the stable learning and long-term memory of list chunks. For example, after 
having learned the words MY and SELF, suppose that the word MYSELF is temporarily stored 
in working memory for the first time. How does a listener learn a new word representation for 
MYSELF that is stored in long-term memory, without erasing the previously learned word 
representations for MY and SELF? When such learning occurs in an unsupervised fashion in real 
time, as it does when a child learns a language, a poorly designed working memory could easily 
cause catastrophic forgetting of MY and SELF when learning MYSELF. 
Working memories that do satisfy these postulates have been called STORE (Sustained 
Temporal Order REcurrent) models. Remarkably, specialized recurrent on-center off-surround 
networks naturally satisfy the STORE postulates. Recurrent on-center off-surround networks are 
ubiquitous in the brain becanse they enable distributed input patterns to be processed without a 
loss of sensitivity by their target cells (Grossberg, 1980). Thus, designing a working memory, 
which may seem at the outset to be a highly sophisticated task, reduces to adapting an ancient 
neural design that is needed to process all sorts of spatially distributed data. 
The Temporal Chunking Problem and Multiple-Scale Chunks in Masking Fields 
In all the examples treated herein, working memories interact reciprocally with a categorization 
network that represents list chunks (Figure 1). These list chnnks may represent the items 
themselves or larger groupings of items of variable length, such as phonemes, letters, syllables or 
words. The chunking network, which is called a masking field (Figure 6a), is designed to select 
those list categories that are most predictive of the temporal context that the items, taken 
together, collectively generate across the working memory as its activity pattern evolves through 
time (Cohen and Grossberg, 1986, 1987; Grossberg, 1978a, 1986; Grossberg and Myers, 2000). 
In particular, the list chunks compete with each other as they dynamically integrate this bottom-
up information. Other things being equal, chunks that represent longer sequences of items, and 
thus represent a less ambiguous temporal context, are preferred over chunks that represent 
shorter sequences of items, np to a maximal list length. This enables a longer novel list like 
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MYSELF to be able to compete with familiar chunks of sh01ter lists like MY and SELF, even 
before the list chunks that MYSELF activates can be tuned through learning to that word. 
A masking field hereby helps to solve what I have called the Temporal Chunking 
Problem (Cohen and Grossberg, 1986; Grossberg, 1984); namely, why is not every list of items 
coded in terms of already familiar chunks, like MY and SELF? How can a new, heretofore non-
existent, word representation of a novel word, like MYSELF, begin to form, under the type of 
unsupervised learning conditions that typify a child's language learning experiences, despite the 
competitive salience of its previously leamed parts, like MY and SELF? Masking Fields help to 
solve the Temporal Chunking Problem by enabling larger chunks to form despite the salience of 
smaller, previously chunked lists, and STORE working memories embody the LTM Invariance 
Principle so that learning of these larger chunks does not force catastrophic forgetting of smaller, 
previously learned, chunks. In particular, the chunks that win the masking field competition 
activate their top-down expectations and thereby selectively amplify and focus attention upon 
consistent working memory items, while suppressing inconsistent working memory items. 
Feedback establishes a resonance which temporarily boosts the activation levels of selected 
working memory items and list chunks, thereby creating an emergent conscious percept. 
Figure 6 
Such multiple-scale chunking networks have been used to explain a variety of data about list 
categorization. An early observation noted how such a network could naturally explain data like 
the classical Miller (1956) "Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two." This property emerges 
when cells that represent unitized representations of longer item lists inhibit the chunks that 
represent shorter item lists. 
Later studies exploited the fact that, because resonances kick in later than their initial 
working memory activations, they can be influenced by information presented after relatively 
long intervening silent intervals. Variations in the durations of speech sounds and silent pauses 
can hereby produce different perceived groupings of words, and future sounds can influence how 
we hear past sounds. For example, the ARTWORD model (see Figure 6b) was developed in 
Grossberg and Myers (2000) to quantitatively simulate context-sensitive speech categorization 
data wherein variable-length list groupings can strongly influence conscious percepts. The 
ARTWORD model generalized the earlier ARTPHONE model by incorporating a multiple-scale 
masking field categorization network. For example, the ARTWORD model was used to 
quantitatively simulate psychophysical data showing that increasing the silent interval between 
the words "gray chip" may result in the percept "great chip", whereas increasing the duration of 
fricative noise in "chip" may alter the percept to "great ship" (Repp et al., 1978); see Figures 7 
and 8. Data of this kind arc paradoxical for several reasons. For example, why should increasing 
the silent interval between the two words "gray" and "chip" cause "gray" to sound like "great"? 
Might not one expect greater temporal separation between two familiar words to make them 
easier to distinguish, not more confusable? Likewise, why should increasing the duration of the 
fricative noise in "chip" make it easier for the noise to leap over the silent interval between it and 
the earlier word "gray" to generate the percept "great", while leaving behind the remainder of the 
word "chip" to which it is temporally contiguous, leading to the percept"ship"? These context-
effects follow naturally from the resonant dynamics of STORE working memory and masking 
field interactions. 
Such data and their explanatory resonances emphasize how future sounds can leap over a 
silent interval, without filling the silent interval with sound, to join a past word. The same type of 
resonance mechanisms were shown in the ARTPHONE simulations of Grossberg, Boardman, 
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and Cohen (1997) to be able, in appropriate contexts, to fill silent intervals with sound that is 
derived from future inputs; namely, ARTPHONE quantitatively simulated how hearing two 
occurrences of the stop consonant C in a VC-CV pair (V = vowel, C = consonant) requires 150 
ms more silence between VC and CV than hearing two different stop consonants, C1 and C2, in 
a VC l-C2V pair (Repp, 1980); see Figure 3. These and many other context-sensitive percepts 
can now be given a unified explanation in terms of how the evolving resonance between working 
memory items and list chunks naturally leads to such context effects. 
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
How is a Temporally-Inval"iant Speech Code Derived from Variable-Rate Speech? 
In order to explain other auditory and speech data, preprocessing of acoustic signals plays a 
crucial role. As noted above, such preprocessing has been proposed to play a role in solving the 
problem of how humans can understand variable-rate speech without having to represent it 
intemally at every rate, and thereby creating an uncontrollable combinatorial explosion and 
undcciferable decoding problem. The ARTPHONE model of Figure 5, and its elaboration in the 
ARTWORD model, suggested that preprocessing in the form of a rate-dependent gain control 
adjusts the integration rate of working memory and chunking networks to keep up with the 
overall speech rate. 
In addition to this long-term change in processing rates, it has also been proposed that a 
rapidly-acting gain control helps to generate more temporally-invariant representations within 
individual syllables. In particular, Cohen and Grossberg (1997) had earlier proposed that 
auditory signals are processed by parallel auditory streams that respond preferentially to transient 
and sustained properties of the acoustic signal before being stored in parallel transient and 
sustained working memories. In fact, it is well known that there are cells in the brain's auditmy 
system that are selectively sensitive to transient and sustained properties of acoustic waveforms 
(Britt and Starr, 1976; Delgutte and Kiang, 1984a, 1984b; Mendelson, Schreiner, Sutter, and 
Grasse, 1993; Moller, 1983; Pickles, 1988; Rhode and Smith, 1986; Sachs and Young, 1979; 
Tian and Rauschecker, 1994; Young and Sachs, 1979). Cohen and Grossberg (1997) suggested 
that this decomposition helps to partially separate coarticulated consonants and vowels and also 
to explain data about eighth nerve processing. Decomposition of sensory signals into transient 
and sustained cell responses is also well known to occur within the visual system. 
Boardman, Grossberg, Myers, and Cohen (1999) went on to propose another use for these 
transient and sustained channels. They introduced the PHONET model (Figure 9) in which the 
transient working memory was proposed to gain-control the integration rate within the sustained 
working memory to provide a more temporally invariant representation within a given syllable or 
word. Several experiments had earlier repmted asymmetric vocalic context effects (Kunisaki and 
Fujisaki, 1977; Mann and Repp, 1980). PHONET provides a rationale for such data by proposing 
how this sort of preprocessing could generate more rate-invariant relative activities of transient 
and sustained working memo1y representations under variable speaking rates. An invariant 
relative activation, in turn, leads to preserved categorization by the chunking network because 
the bottom-up adaptive pathways between the working memory and the list chunks activates the 
same set of chunks when such relative activities are preserved (e.g., Grossberg, 1980). 
Figure 9 
Parallel preprocessing into transient and sustained channels followed by gain control from the 
transient to sustained channel was used in the PHONET model of Boardman et al. (1999) to 
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quantitatively simulate how, in CV syllables such as /ba! and /wa!, an increase in the duration of 
the vowel /a! can cause a switch in the percept of the preceding consonant from /w/ to /b/ (Miller 
and Liberman, 1979), and how a change in frequency extent (namely, total frequency change), 
but not rate, can also influence the /b/-/w/ distinction (Schwab, Sawusch, and Nusbaum, 1981). 
The rapidly acting automatic gain control in the PHONET model is proposed to work 
together with the longer-persisting gain control of the working memory and chunking network 
integration rates of the ARTWORD model. Taken together, these two sorts of gain control begin 
to explain how a temporally-invariant speech representation may be created internally by brain 
dynamics from variable-rate speech signals that themselves do not exhibit obvious properties of 
in variance. Other types of preprocessing are also needed to prepare auditory signals for speech 
analysis, as the following section notes. 
Resonance during Auditory Streaming 
If adaptive resonance is indeed a mechanism to control rapid learning of perceptual and cognitive 
codes without catastrophic forgetting, then resonant interactions may be expected to occur at 
multiple levels of the auditory system. In fact, suitably designed resonance networks have also 
been helpful in explaining data about auditory streaming and the Cocktail Party Problem, albeit 
at a different level of auditory processing (Grossberg, 1999b, 1999c). It is well known that pitch 
is one of the major properties of the auditory signal that is nsed to separate voices or instruments 
into separately perceived auditory streams (Bregman, 1990). In this analysis, auditory signals are 
thus first preprocessed to extract the pitch of a voice or instrument or using a model of early 
auditory preprocessing called the SPINET model, or Spatial Pitch NETwork, which converts 
temporally occurring auditory signals into spatial representations of pitch (Cohen, Grossberg, 
and Wyse, 1995); see Figure 1 Oa. The SPINET model was validated by quantitatively simulating 
many psychophysical data about pitch perception by human observers. Unlike more traditional 
transform models of pitch, the SPINET model proposes bow different spectral and pitch 
representations can be represented in a spatial map. A key hypothesis of SPINET is that 
harmonically-related spectral components (see stages 6 and 7 in Figure 1 Oa) can activate a given 
pitch category through an adaptive filter that obeys laws similar to those which activate list 
categories in the speech models. As in the speech models, it is assumed that the selection of 
harmonics by the filter is due to learning, in particular, learning that is driven by the natural 
harmonic grouping of frequencies due to early auditory processing. 
Figure 10 
Because of its spatial representation, the SPINET model could be naturally extended to define a 
more comprehensive model of pitch-based auditory streaming, called the ARTSTREAM model. 
To do this, the spectral and pitch representations of the SPINET model are extended into 
multiple representations of each frequency and pitch across a spatial map (Figures 1 Ob and !Oc). 
These multiple representations give rise to "strips" of the map that are devoted to a single 
frequency or pitch. A second extension is that a top-down filter encodes the "expectations" that 
the pitch categories learn to expect. Each expectation codes the harmonics of the pitch that is 
represented by the pitch category. A spectral-pitch resonance can occur when a bottom-up 
adaptive filter and its top-down expectation generate a focus of attention. Such a resonance 
represents an auditory stream in the model. 
How can multiple streams simultaneously be experienced? Because of their spatial 
relationships, the multiple spectral and pitch representations can naturally interact across the 
network via cooperative and competitive feedback interactions that resonantly capture harmonic 
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frequencies that belong to the same pitch source within a given stream, while enabling multiple 
streams to coexist simultaneously. In particular, a property like exclusive allocation (Bregman, 
1990) arises because, when a given pitch captures its harmonics via a spectral-pitch resonance, 
its harmonics at the spectral level can activate cross-strip within-frequency competitive 
interactions to the other streams. This competition prevents the other streams from representing 
these frequencies; see Figure lOc. Various other streaming data have also been simulated by the 
ARTSTREAM model, such as the auditory continuity illusion and how gliding frequencies, with 
and without noise, interact when they come together. 
Figure 11 
The auditory continuity illusion (Miller and Licklider, 1950) is a classical example of streaming 
wherein properties of the ART matching rule fairly leap out from the page; see Figure 11. 
Suppose that a steady tone shuts off just as a broadband noise turns on. Suppose, moreover, that 
the noise shuts off just as the tone turns on once again (Figure lla). When this happens under 
appropriate conditions, the tone seems to continue through the noise, which seems to occur in a 
separate auditory stream. This example suggests that the auditory system can actively extract 
those components of the noise that are consistent with the tone and use them to track the "voice" 
of the tone right through the noise. 
Suppose, however, that the tone does not turn on again for a second time, as in Figure 
11 b. Then the first tone cannot continue through the noise to the other end. It is perceived to stop 
before the noise stops. A comparison of Figures 11a and llb raises the question: How does the 
brain use the information about a future event, the second tone, to continue the first tone through 
the noise? Does this not seem to require that the brain can operate "backwards in time" t:o alter 
its decision as to whether or not to continue a past tone through the noise based on future events? 
The ARTSTREAM model proposes that this backwards effect is due to a spectral-pitch 
resonance between the spectral representation of the tone and its pitch category. Such a 
resonance takes awhile to develop after the first tone occurs, but it takes much less time for the 
second tone to re-excite it once it has already begun, much as in the case of the second /b/ during 
resonant fusion of [ib]-[ba], as in Figure 4c. The third property of the auditory continuity illusion 
shows that the ART matching rule is obeyed here, and exhibits the same computational property 
whereby it helped to explain phonemic restoration. In particular, suppose that no noise occurs 
between two temporally disjoint tones, as in Figure llc. Then the tone is not heard across the 
silent interval. Instead, two temporally disjoint tones are heard. A comparison of Figures 11 b and 
1lc indicates that the brain uses the noise to continue the tone through it. The matching law can 
select a noise component that is consistent with the pitch category (Figure 1 lb), but it cannot 
create a spectral sound unless there is already pitch-consistent activation at the spectral level that 
was caused by bottom-up inputs (Figure 1lc). 
The Intimate Link between Auditory Information Processing and Learning in the Brain 
In order for the auditory system to efficiently integrate information across its several processing 
levels, the mechanisms that occur at these levels need to be computationally consistent. ART 
predicts that there is a deeper reason why multiple levels of auditory processing may all use 
resonant dynamics. ART predicts that resonant processes enable our brains to continue to learn 
about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life. These processes include the learning 
of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the 
focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant 
states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between 
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what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in 
the brain are resonant states, and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and 
cognitive representations. The auditory models outlined above are proposed to be specialized 
versions of ART mechanisms for stably leaming about temporally evolving auditory information 
about the world. Said in another way, ART clarifies how humans can so quickly learn to perceive 
and understand speech and language without experiencing catastrophic forgetting. This 
hypothesis suggests that experiments which attempt to probe the brain's designs for speech and 
language should attempt, wherever possible, to link studies of information processing with 
manipulations of learning. 
In addition to ART explanations of temporal data from audition and speech, variants of 
ART circuits have also been used to quantitatively simulate psychophysical and neurobiological 
data from early vision and visual object recognition. In the visual system, it has been shown how 
predicted ART top-down expectation and attentional priming and matching mechanisms are 
realized by known laminar circuits of visual thalamus and cortex (Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg 
and Raizada, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2001); see Figure 2b. Given that all of sensory and 
cognitive neocortex shares key laminar circuit properties, it will be interesting to test the 
hypothesis that similar circuits, suitably specialized, may operate in auditory thalamocortical 
circuits. 
It should also be noted that, although ART mechanisms are suggested to be used in many 
sensory and cognitive processes, it is not proposed that they are used for all brain processes. In 
particular, sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain seem to 
obey top-clown matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial 
and motor processing in the brain's Where/How processing stream (Grossberg, 2000). This 
enables sens01y and cognitive representations in the What stream to use their ART-like 
processing to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial 
and motor representations to forget learn eel maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our 
bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. In fact, detailed neural models of 
sensory-motor control and procedural memory clarify why procedural memories are not 
conscious: They use a form of inhibitory matching process that cannot lead to resonance, hence 
cannot lead to consciousness (Bullock, Cisek, and Grossberg, l 998; Cisek, Grossberg, and 
Bullock, 1998; Contreras-Viclal, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1997; Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock, 
1996; Grossberg, Roberts, Aguilar, and Bullock, 1997). 
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Figure l. ART matching: (a) Auditory items activate short term memory (STM) traces in a 
working memory, which send bottom-up signals towards a level at which list categories, or 
chunks, are activated in STM. These bottom-up signals are multiplied by learned long-term 
memory (LTM) traces that influence the competitive selection of the list categories that are 
stored in STM. The list categories, in turn, activate top-down expectation signals that are also 
read out of LTM. These expectations, or prototypes, are matched against the active STM pattern 
in working memory. (b) This matching process selects STM activations that are supported by 
contiguous LTM traces (large hem-disks) and suppresses those that are not. [Reprinted with 
permission from Grossberg (1999b).] 
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Figure 2. (a) The ART matching rule may be realized by a modulatory top-down on-center off-
surround network. When only bottom-up signals 1 and 2 are active, they can activate their target 
cells. When only the top-down expectation is active, it cannot activate any cells. This is because 
a cell that receives an excitatmy signal in the on-center will also receive an approximately 
matched inhibitory signal. The baseline activity of such a cell may be slightly excited by a net 
advantage to the excitatory pathway. Cells that receive no excitatory signals can be suppressed. 
When both bottom-up and top-down signals are active, the bottom-up activation caused by 
pathway 2 can persist, and even be amplified, but the bottom-up activation caused by pathway 1 
is suppressed by the off-surround. (b) One known anatomical pathway by which cortical cells 
from a higher level, in this case area V2 of the visual cortex, can attentionally modulate the 
activity of cells at a lower level, in this case area V 1. In particular, a top-down output signal from 
layer 6 of the higher conical area can activate apical dendrites of layer 5 pyramidal cells at the 
lower cortical area. These pyramidal cells can activate layer 6 of the lower cortical area, which in 
turn activates a modulatory on-center off-surround network of inputs to layer 4 of the lower 
cortical area. This circuitous route from layer 6-to-6-to-4 is called "folded feedback" because it 
folds feedback from a higher cortical area into the bottom-up processing of signals within a 
lower cortical area. [Rerpinted with permission from Grossberg and Raizada (2000).] 
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silent interval (msec) 
Figure 3. Probability of perceiving two syllables in response to the VC-CV pairs [ib]-[ga] and 








[ib]-[ba.J --+ [iba] 
fusion 
[ib]-[ga] --+ [iga] 
mismatch 
.__ILJl_ 
+ closure interya! 
(b) 
[ib]-[ha] or [ih]-[ga] 
(d) 
Figure 4. Heuristic summary of the resonances that are proposed to explain the data in Figure 3. 
(a) Response to a single stop with (solid line) and without (dashed line) resonant feedback. The 
ordinate represents category node activity and the abscissa represents time. The horizontal line 
represents an activation above which resonance occurs, along with a conscious percept. Resonant 
activation is shaded. (b) Reset due to phonologic mismatch. Here the activity corresponding to 
/b/ is reset by mismatch with /b/ before /b/ can resonate. Only the /g/ sounds reaches resonance, 
leading to a percept of /iga!. (c) It takes awhile for the /b/ activity to grow large enough to 
resonate, but a second occurrence of fbi can more quickly boost already resonant activity. If the 
second /b/ occurs before the resonance in response to the first /b/ can collapse, then fusion of the 
two /b/ sounds can occur over the intervening silent interval, leading to prolongation of the /iba/ 
resonance through time. (d) A sufficiently long silent interval allows a two-stop percept to be 
beard. Habituative collapse of the /ib/ resonance before the /ba/ or /gal resonance develops leads 
to a percept of both syllables separated by a silent interval. [Adapted with permission from 
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Figure 5. The ARTPHONE model: Working memoty item activities (w) excite list chunk 
activities (u) through previously learned bottom-up pathways. List chunk activities send lop-
down excitatory feedback down to their item source cells. Bottom-up and top-down pathways are 
modulated by habituative transmitter gates (filled squares). Itrom nodes receive input in an on-
center off-surround anatomy. Total input (I) is averaged to control and item rate signals that 
adjusts the working memory gain (g). This gain tracks the speech rate and adjusts the integration 
rates of working memory and chunking network accordingly. Excitatory paths are marked with 
arrowheads, inhibitory paths with small open circles. [Reprinted with permission from 
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Figure 6. Masking field and ARTWORD model: (a) A masking field is organized so that longer 
item sequences, up to some optimal length, selectively activate cells with more potent masking, 
or inhibitory, properties. Familiar individual items, as well as item sequences, may be 
represented in the masking field. [Reprinted with permission from Cohen and Grossberg, 1986.] 
(b) The ARTWORD model incorporates the same types of mechanisms as in the ARTPHONE 
model, with the addition of a multiple-scale masking field. [Reprinted with permission from 
Grossberg and Myers (2000).] 
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Figure 7. Perceptual boundaries repmted in Repp et al. (1978). [Adapted with permission from 
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Figure 8. Category boundaries derived from the Repp et al. (1978) data and from ARTWORD 
model predictions: (a) GRAY-GREAT, data. (b) GRAY-GREAT, ARTWORD simulation. (c) 
CHIP-SHIP, data. (d) CHIP-SHIP, ARTWORD simulation. [Reprinted with permission from 













Figure 9. (a) PHONET model. Formant transitions input acoustic energy across an array of local 
channels. At each spatial location, there is a pair of local feature detectors, one responsive to 
sustained input energy (circled clots) and the other to changes in energy (circled up-going 
arrows). The activations from the local detectors across a broad region are temporarily stored by 
sustained and transient working memories (S and T). The transient channel response modulates 
the processing rate of the sustained channel. (b) Data prediction algorithm. Activities of S and T 
detectors are determined on the basis of the input and used to compute activities of the S and T 
working memories. The SIT ratio is formed from working memory activities in order to compute 
the same type of invariant as does the adaptive filter from working memory to phonetic 
categories, as in (a). White noise is added to the result. With probability l - a, the subject 
responds /ba/ if the resulting sum exceeds a threshold, and with probability a, the subject 
guesses. [Reprinted with permission from Boardman et al. (1999).] 
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Figure 10. SPINET and ARTSTREAM 
models: (a) SPINET model processing stages. 
See text for details. [Reprinted with 
permission from Cohen, Grossberg, and 
Wyse (1995).] (b) ARTSTREAM model 
processing stages. The spectral and pitch 
layers of the SPINET model are elaborated in 
the ARTSTREAM model into multiple 
representations, or strips of cells, and top-
clown ART matching also occurs. (c) 
(c) Cooperative and competitive interactions 
among these strips help to select coherent 
streams which obey rules like cxclnsive allocation. Because each pitch stream is a winner-take-
all network, only one pitch category can be active at any time in a given stream. Across streams 
in the pitch stream layer, asymmetric competition occurs for each pitch so that one stream is 
biased to win and the same pitch cannot be represented in another stream. The winning pitch 
category feeds back excitation to its harmonics in the corresponding strectal stream. This stream 
also receives nonspecific inhibition from the pitch slayer. ART matching is hereby realized. It 
suppresses those spectral components that are not harmonically related to the active pitch. Cross-
stream within-frequency inhibition then prevents the resonating frequency from being 








Figure 11. The auditory continuity illusion. See text for details. [Reprinted with permission fi:om 
Grossberg (1999b).] 
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